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 Rule-utilitarianism has recently enjoyed a resurgence of interest, aroused in part 
by the promise of contemporary versions of rule-utilitarianism to more successfully 
achieve the advantages classically claimed for rule utilitarian theories: to deliver 
prescriptions that match our pre-analytic moral intuitions about the moral status of 
individual acts; and to satisfy two significant claims – the claim that morality must serve 
to enhance human welfare, and the claim that morality must be universalizable.1 
 An intriguing new debate has now broken out about how best to formulate rule-
utilitarianism – whether to evaluate moral codes in terms of the value of their 
consequences at a fixed rate (such as ninety per cent) of social acceptance (as Brad 
Hooker contends),2 or to evaluate codes in terms of the value of their consequences 
throughout the entire range of possible acceptance rates (as Michael Ridge contends).3 I 
shall introduce and argue that still a third formulation, optimum-rate rule-utilitarianism, 
achieves certain goals better than either Hook’s fixed-rate rule-utilitarianism or Ridge’s 
variable-rate rule-utilitarianism. But I shall also argue that none of these versions of rule-
utilitarianism survive two criticisms that appear to broadly undermine rule-utilitarianism 
in any of its likely variants.   
 
1. HOOKER’S FIXED-RATE RULE-UTILITARIANISM, AND RIDGE’S 
VARIABLE-RATE RULE-UTILITARIANISM  
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 Early rule utilitarians tested whether or not moral code C constitutes an ideal set 
of moral rules by comparing the consequences of 100 per cent social compliance with C 
to the consequences of 100 per cent social compliance with rival sets of rules.4 ‘100 per 
cent compliance’ may be understood to mean ‘no agent does what is prohibited by C.’   
 Subsequent rule utilitarians typically rejected this test in favor of assessing a 
moral code by reference to the consequences of the code if it were accepted by fewer 
than 100 per cent of the agents governed by the code. As Hooker describes this test, an 
agent who ‘accepts’ (which he calls ‘internalizing’) a code is understood to be someone 
who has dispositions to comply with the code, to encourage and form favorable attitudes 
towards others who comply, to feel guilt or shame when she breaks the code, to condemn 
and resent others’ breaking it, etc., and furthermore believes that these dispositions are 
justified.5 Such an agent, however, may not always do as the code prescribes – she may 
make mistakes in applying the code, or succumb to the temptation to promote her own 
interests or the interests of her loved ones rather than do what the code requires. Thus 
Hooker’s formulation of rule-utilitarianism reads as follows:6   
An act is wrong if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization 
by the overwhelming majority of everyone everywhere in each new 
generation has maximum expected value in terms of well-being (with some 
priority for the worst-off). The calculation of a code’s expected value 
includes all costs of getting the code internalized. If in terms of expected 
value two or more codes are better than the rest but equal to one another, the 
one closest to conventional morality determines what acts are wrong.7 
 
 Hooker interprets ‘overwhelming majority’ to mean ninety per cent acceptance.8 
The move from a 100 per cent compliance test to a less-than-100 per cent acceptance test 
is substantially motivated by the need to devise a code that would include realistic 
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provisions for ‘partial compliance’ situations – situations in which not everyone does as 
morality requires. Unlike codes evaluated at 100 per cent compliance levels, an ideal 
code evaluated at a less-than-100 per cent acceptance rate will include such provisions, 
even though their inclusion makes it more burdensome to learn the code.9   
 Ridge objects to Hooker’s fixed-rate rule-utilitarianism (hereafter, FRRU) 
primarily because it is arbitrary to fix ninety per cent acceptance as the key acceptance 
point. Why not eighty-eight per cent, or eighty-nine per cent, or ninety-one per cent or 
ninety-two per cent? What if only sixty per cent of the population accepts the moral 
code? Any successful code must be formulated to address issues that arise at any such 
level of acceptance. To choose a single exact acceptance point is arbitrary, and nothing so 
important about morality should be arbitrary.10   
 To avoid such arbitrariness, Ridge introduces ‘variable-rate rule-utilitarianism’ 
(hereafter, VRRU), which assesses a proposed moral code by estimating the 
consequences of that code at all possible levels of social acceptance, not just at some 
privileged fixed level of social acceptance such as ninety per cent. His own version of 
VRRU may be stated as follows: 
An act is morally right if it would be permitted (or required) by a moral 
code whose average expected value for all different levels of social 
acceptance is at least as high as that of any alternative code.11 
 
Ridge’s theory evaluates a code by calculating the average of the expected values of the 
consequences of a code’s acceptance at all possible rates of acceptance, from 0 per cent 
through 100 per cent acceptance.   
 Ridge argues that his theory has all the advantages but none of the problems 
associated with FRRU,12  and specifically that it avoids the charge of arbitrariness, since 
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it does not rely on identification of some specific level of social acceptance, but considers 
the consequences of a code across the whole spectrum of social acceptance rates.13   
 
2. OPTIMUM-RATE RULE-UTILITARIANISM  
 Ridge’s VRRU avoids the charge of arbitrariness by examining a moral code’s 
acceptance-utility across every possible level of social acceptance. However, it is far 
from clear that this is the most intuitively attractive technique for avoiding arbitrariness. 
It is true that testing a code by its acceptance-utility at exactly ninety per cent acceptance 
seems arbitrary – but why test its acceptance-utility at every possible level, when in 
reality it must be accepted at some level or the other? Fortunately, there is another 
version of rule-utilitarianism utilizing an acceptance rate that is not arbitrary at all, and 
that seems to capture far better than either Hooker’s or Ridge’s versions the 
consequentialist spirit of rule-utilitarianism. To see this, recall that Hooker envisages that 
each generation would teach the ideal code to the next generation.14 In selecting a code, 
the teaching generation will ask themselves ‘Which moral code would produce the best 
consequences?’ The consequences a given code produces are a function of two main 
factors: the content of the code, and the proportion of the population that accepts that 
code.15 But the teaching generation can affect what proportion of the population accepts a 
given code through deft choice of teaching technique. For example, a harsher teaching 
technique may induce a larger proportion of the population to accept the code. Of course 
the techniques used to teach the code, and to secure its maintenance, themselves have an 
impact on social welfare, and Hooker correctly includes these costs as part of what has to 
be evaluated in appraising different codes. All this suggests that the teaching generation 
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faces a choice over what we can call ‘acceptance profiles’ of the different codes that 
might be taught, as represented in the following graph.16 
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An ‘acceptance profile’ of a code is the set of expected values it would produce at each of 
the possible levels of social acceptance (where the expected value of a code includes such 
items as the consequences of acts that comply with the code, the value of the code’s 
psychological ‘acceptance effects,’ the costs and benefits of teaching and maintaining it, 
etc.). Once we think in terms of code acceptance profiles, we can immediately see that – 
quite apart from the question of dealing with partial compliance -- it might be irrational 
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for the teaching generation to select a code in terms of the social welfare it would 
produce at 100 per cent acceptance. Although the expected social welfare produced by 
most normatively plausible codes rises as their acceptance levels rise, after a certain point 
the expected social welfare produced by many codes decreases as the increasingly 
burdensome cost of teaching and maintaining the more demanding or esoteric provisions 
of code outstrips the good procured by each degree of increased acceptance.17 Agents will 
resist performing morally required actions when the personal cost is great, so that the 
effort to secure acceptance in these instances may outweigh the net good done by agents’ 
acceptance of the code in such circumstances. (The acceptance levels profiled in this 
chart represent both how many agents accept the code in question, and how many 
occasions the agents accept the code in question as governing their choices on that 
occasion.) Thus the teaching generation would not necessarily select a code with the aim 
of securing 100 per cent acceptance of the code, since expected social welfare achieved 
by 100 per cent acceptance will often be less than the expected social welfare achievable 
at some lower level of acceptance. Moreover, the code that has the best consequences at 
100 per cent acceptance may not have as good consequences at its optimum point as the 
optimum consequences achievable by some other code with worse consequences at 100 
per cent acceptance. For example, compare Code E with Code F. At 100 per cent 
acceptance, code E would have better effects than Code F would at 100 per cent. 
Nonetheless, at the level of acceptance at which Code F would achieve its optimum 
effects – roughly seventy-five per cent acceptance -- the social value produced by Code F 
would outstrip both the social value produced by Code E at 100 per cent acceptance and 
the social value at the level of acceptance at which Code E would achieve its optimum 
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effects – roughly eighty per cent acceptance. The obvious thing for the teaching 
generation to do is to compare codes to see which code achieves the highest optimum 
acceptance level, where the optimum acceptance level for a code is the level of 
acceptance at which it achieves the greatest expected social good. The acceptance level 
that achieves this optimum will vary from code to code, and typically be less than 100 per 
cent acceptance.                                                                        
 Among the codes represented on this chart, Code F offers the highest optimum 
point. The teaching generation ought to select Code F to teach the new generation, and 
then aim, using the relevant teaching methods, to secure the acceptance level for Code F 
that would achieve this optimum point. Let us call the rule utilitarian theory that captures 
this idea ‘optimum-rate rule-utilitarianism’ (ORRU). It may be stated as follows: 
ORRU: An ideal code is the code whose optimum acceptance level is no lower 
than that of any alternative code. 
Note that the ninety per cent acceptance level, the level on which Hooker focuses, is not 
necessarily the optimum acceptance level for any given code, or for the best code. Thus 
his theory irrationally advocates teaching and acting in accordance with a code (such as 
E) that may fall short of the optimum level of expected social utility achievable through 
some other available code. No teaching generation would make such a choice. Note also 
that once the teaching generation asks which code it should teach, there is no reason for it 
to consider the acceptance-utilities for the various codes at all the possible levels of 
acceptance. Contra Ridge’s claim, they need only concentrate on which code will enable 
them to achieve the highest acceptance-utility, and teach that one.18 
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3. FRRU, VRRU, ORRU, AND THE PARTIAL COMPLIANCE PROBLEM  
 All versions of rule-utilitarianism must deal with the ‘partial compliance’ problem 
– the problem generated by the fact that, while a given moral code might produce 
excellent effects if everyone accepted or complied with it, it may produce extremely bad 
effects in a real-world situation in which there is only partial compliance or acceptance 
with the code. For example, Hooker describes a partial compliance case involving river 
pollution.19 There, following Lyons,20 he notes the distinction between cases involving 
maximizing conditions (where the agent needs to make the best of a generally good 
situation created by other agents’ contributions to produce a public good) and cases 
involving minimizing conditions (where the agent needs to make the best of a generally 
bad situation created by other agents’ failures to contribute to the production of a public 
good). In the pollution case, an important public good would be secured if almost 
everyone avoided polluting the river. If ninety per cent of the industries bordering the 
river dispose of their waste elsewhere, the river will be healthy. However, if fewer than 
ninety per cent dispose of their waste elsewhere, and more than ten per cent of the 
industries instead discharge waste into the river, the river will be dangerously polluted. 
On the other hand, suppose almost all the industries bordering the river discharge their 
waste into it so that the river is seriously polluted. If you are one of the industrialists, for 
you to join the few industrialists who avoid discharging waste into the river would be to 
impose a cost on yourself without producing any public good, since the river will be 
polluted whatever you do.21   
 How should a rule utilitarian deal with such cases? Ridge, like many rule 
utilitarians, argues that the best way to deal with the problem is to incorporate into the 
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moral code what I shall call ‘conditionalized rules’ prescribing or proscribing certain 
activities conditional on the level of a code’s acceptance in society. He argues that the 
importance of avoiding heavy learning costs indicates that the best code would be one 
incorporating relatively few conditionalized rules for dealing with non-acceptance, stated 
with quite coarse-grained conditions, such as ‘When most people accept the code, do X’ 
and ‘When less than half the people accept the code, do Y.’22 For the pollution case, the 
relevant rules might be ‘When most people accept the code, dispose of your waste 
elsewhere,’ and ‘When less than half the people accept the code, dispose of your waste in 
the river.’   
 How does Hooker deal with the problem of partial compliance? Hooker agrees 
that it would be unfair to require anyone to follow a burdensome rule for the sake of a 
public good when this rule is being ignored by most others, and agrees that rule-
utilitarianism must provide a way to avoid this kind of unfairness.23  He states that rule-
consequentialism ‘must not require agents to make sacrifices for others who are able to 
follow the same rule but won’t’.24 But exactly how does it avoid doing so?25 The obvious 
suggestion is that his ideal code, like Ridge’s, would include conditionalized rules 
permitting otherwise forbidden conduct when enough others are engaging in this conduct.   
Thus his FRRU might include such rules as the following:26 
R*: If enough other people are failing to contribute to the production of a 
public good that your contribution would not secure its attainment, then 
you ought not to contribute if doing so is costly.    
 Thus both Ridge and Hooker can be interpreted as claiming that the best rule 
utilitarian solution to the partial compliance problem is to adopt conditionalized rules 
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specifying how an agent is to act as a function of how others are acting in the same 
situation. I shall assume that ORRU would adopt the same strategy. 
4. A FATAL PROBLEM FOR FRRU, VRRU, AND ORRU  
 I will argue that Ridge’s VRRU, Hooker’s FRRU, and my ORRU – and indeed 
any version of rule-utilitarianism that invokes conditionalized rules to solve the partial 
compliance problem -- suffer from a fatal problem not noticed by either Hooker or Ridge. 
I shall begin by describing how the problem arises for Ridge’s VRRU. 
 As we have seen, Ridge argues that the ideal code best handles partial compliance 
problems – at different levels of acceptance -- by including coarse-grained conditional 
rules of the form ‘When virtually everyone accepts the code, do V,’ or ‘When less than 
half the people accept the code, do Y.’27 The argument for a code incorporating such 
rules is that such a code would have higher average expected value than rival codes not 
incorporating conditionalized rules. Unfortunately this is false. A code incorporating 
conditionalized rules referring to the contributions of others towards producing some 
jointly-producible public good may have no determinate expected value at all.28 In 
such cases the code cannot be judged to have a higher expected value than any rival code. 
 To see the problem, consider a slightly revised and more detailed version of the 
pollution case. In this version, three industrialists own factories bordering the river, you 
among them. If two or more of the industrialists discharge waste into the river, it will be 
severely polluted. But if one or none discharge waste, and the others burn their waste, the 
river will remain healthy, and no other environmental damage will be done (although 
each industrialist who burns factory waste pays a higher price for disposal than she would 
if she discharged waste into the river).   
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 The relevant conditionalized rules for a code governing this case would be as 
follows: 
Code C 
R1: If two other industrialists are discharging waste, you ought to discharge. 
R2: If one other industrialist is discharging waste, while the other is burning 
waste, you ought to burn your waste. 
R3: If no other industrialist is discharging waste, you ought to discharge your 
waste.29   
 
 Suppose you are industrialist C. The following chart represents the possible 
choices that might confront you. For example, in Choice 1 the other two industrialists are 
both discharging their waste, and your choice is either to discharge (D) or to burn (B)  
your waste in this situation. The river will be polluted whichever choice you make. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 In these circumstances as industrialist C you have one possible occasion (Choice 
1) on which your choice should be governed by rule R1; 2 possible occasions (Choices 2 
and 3) on which your choice should be governed by rule R2; and 1 possible occasion 
(Choice 4) on which your choice should be governed by rule R3. Each of the other two 
industrialists has the same array of possible choices as seen from their perspectives. 
  Choice 1 Choice 2 Choice 3 Choice 4 
Industries D B D B D B D B D B D B D B D B 
A x   x   x   x    x  x  x  x 
B x   x    x  x x   x    x  x 
C x     x x     x x     x x     x 
Conseq's Polluted river 
Polluted 
river 
Polluted
river 
Healthy 
river 
Polluted
river 
Healthy 
river 
Healthy 
river 
Healthy 
river 
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 Let us apply Ridge’s theory to this situation. To take just the simplest question: 
what would the consequences be at 100 per cent acceptance - i.e. if all three industrialists 
accepted Code C? As soon as we ask this question, we can see that it has no determinate 
answer. For simplicity let us assume that each industrialist’s accepting the code would 
result in his complying with it. If all three accepted and complied with Code C, there are 
two possible abstract patterns of discharging and burning waste, as shown in the 
following chart: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
In Case 1, each industrialist appropriately accepts (and complies with) rule R1 of Code C.  
In Case 2, industrialists X and Y appropriately accept (and comply with) rule R2, while 
industrialist Z appropriately accepts (and complies with) rule R3. But these two patterns 
of action, predicated on universal acceptance of Code C, have very different 
consequences: in Case 1 the consequences (a polluted river) are very bad, while in Case 2 
the consequences are very good (a healthy river, and one industrialist saves costs). Since 
either of these patterns of action (note Case 2 has several distinct realizations) involves 
universal acceptance of the code, but have very different consequences, it is 
indeterminate what the consequences would be of universal acceptance of the code.30   
  Case 1 Case 2
Industries D B D B 
X x    x 
Y x    x 
Z x   x   
Conseq's Pollutedriver 
Healthy 
river 
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 Ridge advocates assessing moral codes by calculating their average expected 
value, which is arrived at by ascertaining their expected values at various levels of 
acceptance. This only compounds the problem just seen. Consider a scenario in which 
there are 100 sets of three industrialists whose factories are located on the banks of 100 
rivers, each industrialist facing the same waste disposal and polluting options as in the 
original story. At one level of acceptance, in which all 100 trios of industrialists accept 
and comply with Code C, the expected value of their doing so is indeterminate, since 
some trios may comply by all following rule R1, while other trios may comply by 
displaying appropriate patterns of following R2 and R3. But other levels of acceptance 
display the same indeterminacy. Suppose only ninety per cent of the industrialists accept 
Code C. Some trios of industrialists who are located together on one river will all accept 
and comply with Code C. But again, some of these trios may comply by all following R1, 
while other trios may comply by following R2 and R3. As we’ve seen, these two patterns 
of full compliance lead to very different consequences. So just by looking at these ‘full 
acceptance’ trios alone, without looking at what the non-accepters would do (and not 
even considering the complication that some industrialists who accept C may not 
successfully comply with its demands) we can see that there is no determinate answer to 
the question of what the consequences would be if ninety per cent of the industrialists 
accept C.  And of course this will be true for every possible level of acceptance that 
involves at least some trios of joint code-accepters.  
 This shows that Ridge cannot plausibly hope to solve partial compliance problems 
through utilizing rules that incorporate conditions referring to what contributions other 
agents are making to the production of some jointly-producible public good (or bad). Of 
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course, it is unlikely that Ridge would advocate a version of VRRU that included rules 
such as R1 – R3, which are tailored specifically to one situation. But these rules reveal a 
problem that is more general, and crops up however such rules might be phrased, so long 
as they prescribe the same actions that R1 – R3 prescribe. Note especially that the 
advocate of VRRU cannot hope to avoid indeterminacy by rejecting overtly 
conditionalized rules and instead endorsing non-conditionalized rules such as ‘Act so as 
to maximize social good in your circumstances’ to guide agents in cases such as the 
pollution case. Since the recommendation of this rule for any agent depends on what the 
other agents are doing, this rule, too, counts as being universally followed in both Cases 1 
and 2 by the agents in Figure 2, and must be seen as covertly conditionalized. 
 This problem is not unique to Ridge’s VRRU. It is equally devastating for FRRU, 
and for my proposed ORRU, since they, too, attempt to deal with partial compliance 
cases by use of conditionalized rules. As I have argued, Hooker’s best strategy for 
dealing with partial compliance cases is to adopt conditionalized rules similar to those 
utilized in Ridge’s theory. Thus he should adopt (and may have considered himself as 
adopting) a set of rules that could be stated something as follows: 
R*: If enough other people are failing to contribute to the production of a public 
good that your contribution would not secure its attainment, then you ought not to 
contribute if doing so is costly.  
R**: If enough other people are contributing to the production of a public good 
that adding your contribution is necessary and sufficient for its attainment, then 
you ought to contribute. 
R***: If enough other people are contributing to the production of a public good 
to ensure its attainment, while your contribution would be personally costly, then 
you ought not to contribute.31 
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But these conditionalized rules are simply more general versions of rules R1 – R3, and 
they would be equally indeterminate for partial compliance problems arising at Hooker’s 
fixed acceptance point of ninety per cent, as well as when applied to partial compliance 
problems (such as the pollution case) that arise at other contribution rates. My proposed 
ORRU would include similar rules, and fall prey to the same problem. 
 We have now found that Ridge’s VRRU, Hooker’s FRRU, and my ORRU use a 
technique for dealing with partial compliance cases that fatally undermines all three 
theories. Unless proponents of rule-utilitarianism can devise some successful strategy for 
dealing with partial compliance cases that avoids this flaw by eschewing conditionalized 
rules (or their equivalent), we have raised serious question whether any version of rule-
utilitarianism can coherently give us the recommendations we need for partial 
compliance situations.32 The use of conditionalized rules has sometimes been criticized 
on grounds that it leads to a rule-utilitarianism that is extensionally equivalent to act-
utilitarianism. Couching rule-utilitarianism in terms of ‘acceptance’ rather than 
‘compliance’ is often advocated on the ground that it avoids this extensional equivalence, 
but it does not avoid the problem of indeterminacy I have described here. 
 
5.  A SECOND FATAL PROBLEM FOR FRRU, VRRU, AND ORRU 
 Finally, I will describe a problem for these forms of rule-utilitarianism that has 
not previously been remarked.  Consider again a rule’s ‘acceptance profile’.  Previously I 
characterized the ‘acceptance profile’ of a code as the set of expected values it would 
produce at all the possible levels of social acceptance (where the expected value of a code 
includes such items as the consequences of acts in accord with the code, the value of the 
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code’s ‘acceptance effects,’ the costs and benefits of teaching and maintaining it, etc.).  
However, this description of the components of a code’s expected value fails to mention 
a critical element: the effects, for each given level of acceptance, of the associated level 
of non-acceptance. Thus if a code requiring agents to keep their promises has an 
acceptance level of sixty per cent, this means that sixty per cent of the agents accept an 
obligation to keep their promises (and/or accept this obligation on sixty per cent of the 
occasions on which they have made promises), and that forty per cent of the agents don’t 
accept this obligation (and/or don’t accept it on forty per cent of the occasions on which 
they have made promises). To calculate the overall expected consequences of sixty per 
cent acceptance of this code, we must know both the effects produced by those who 
accept it, and the effects produced by those who fail to accept it (let us call these the 
‘rejecters’). The implications of this fact seem to be overlooked by rule utilitarians in 
their discussions of what the consequences of a given code would be, since these 
discussions typically focus only on the effects of acceptance or compliance.   
 To know what the consequences would be of the actions of the rejecters, we must 
know what they would do instead of accepting the code. But what would they do? There 
are many different ways of not accepting a code. Suppose Code C* requires debtors to 
repay all their debts. There are many ways in which one could reject this code, and there 
are many different ways one might act in light of the fact one rejects C*. For example, 
one might reject this code and instead accept and follow a different code – but a code 
whose recommendations frequently coincide with those of C* in almost cases (for 
example, such a code might require debtors to repay all debts except those that would 
reduce the debtor to abject poverty). The acts of this type of C* code-rejecter would 
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frequently duplicate those of C* code-accepters. But there are also many ways of 
rejecting C* that are likely to lead to very different actions from those performed by 
accepters of Code C*. For example, one might reject C* but accept a code whose 
recommendations often diverge from those of C*, but still require certain efforts to repay 
debts (such a code might permit partial or delayed repayment of debts when the debtor is 
hard-pressed for funds). Or one might reject C* but accept a code whose 
recommendations diverge from C* in being more demanding (such a code, pinning honor 
on reciprocal generosity, might dictate that debts should be repaid at double their 
amount). Or one might reject C* but accept a code that permits avoiding repayment of 
debts by killing those to whom one inconveniently owes money. Or one might reject C*, 
and indeed reject all codes, in favor of acting purely out of whim or self-interest. The 
possible ways of rejecting a given code are legion, and they can lead to very different 
actions, even among agents facing the same situation. This is not merely a logical 
possibility; it seems likely that different rejecters will reject any given code in many 
different ways. 
 Each of these ways of ‘not accepting’ the code would have different effects on 
social welfare. The consequences of a sixty per cent acceptance rate for a given code 
depend heavily on what the code rejecters would do, and it is not at all clear that we have 
any reliable way to determine what this would be – especially for cases in the further 
future.33 
 Of course a similar point could be raised about the multitude of different ways of 
accepting a code (quite apart from the fact that one can accept a code but actually fail to 
comply). A debtor could repay a $100 debt by handing the lender a $100 bill, or by 
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handing the lender ten $10 bills, or by writing a check, or by using PayPal, or by sending 
a money order through the mail, etc. In some cases these different ways of accepting the 
code would have different consequences (perhaps the debtor’s handing the money in 
person to the lender would lead to further beneficial interactions between them, whereas 
sending a money order would end their interactions). However, insofar as a given code 
specifies the agent’s duty in fairly concrete terms, the room for variance in carrying out 
the code’s prescriptions may be somewhat less problematic than the room for variance in 
ways in which agents can fail to accept the code.34 
 Unless we have a way of determining what the code-rejecters would do, we can’t 
calculate the expected value of a given code for any acceptance level below 100 per cent. 
And as an empirical matter, answering this question seems like an insurmountable hurdle. 
A proponent of rule-utilitarianism might attempt to solve this problem by simply 
stipulating what the rejecters would do, rather than trying to ascertain what they would 
do by determining the truth of the relevant counterfactuals. For example, it might be 
stipulated that the rejecters would follow self-interest rather than accept the code. Or it 
might be stipulated that the rejecters would obey the prevailing morality rather than the 
code under consideration. But how is the theorist to non-arbitrarily pick which stipulation 
to make?  I cannot see any reasoned way to do this.    
 An advocate of rule-utilitarianism might hope that it makes no difference which 
baseline manner of non-acceptance we choose for comparing the consequences of each 
code at any given level of acceptance. If this were true, some Code C* could be shown to 
be superior to a rival Code C** whether we stipulate that all the rejecters pursue their 
self-interest, or stipulate that all the rejecters follow the prevailing moral code, or 
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whatever. Hence we could select this baseline arbitrarily without affecting our 
determination of which code is best.35 This hope might seem to be borne out by the 
following chart, in which an agent’s available acts (A, B, C, etc.) are shown arrayed 
against columns designating which act would be chosen by which code (e.g. Code C* 
prescribes act B), which act would maximize self-interest (act A), which act is prescribed 
by the prevailing morality (act C), and the net social value that would be produced by 
each act. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
  
 Suppose we arbitrarily stipulate that the ‘baseline’ act that would be performed by 
a code rejecter is the self-interested act (that is, any agent who fails to accept the code 
performs the self-interested act). Thus, consider two agents who have precisely the same 
array of options shown in Figure 3, and let us compare the consequences of a fifty per 
cent acceptance rate with Code C* and alternatively with Code C**. The comparison 
between (a) the consequences of a fifty per cent acceptance rate for Code C* (one 
compliant act B with a net social value of 100, plus one non-compliant act A with a net 
social value of ninety = 190) and (b) the consequences of a fifty per cent acceptance rate 
for Code C** (one compliant act D with a net social value of eighty plus one non-
compliant act A with a net social value of ninety = 170) would be as follows: 
Act 
Code 
C* 
Code 
C** 
Self 
interested 
act 
Prevailing 
morality 
Net 
social 
value 
A     X   90 
B X       100 
C       X 10 
D   X     80 
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Figure 4 
 
 Suppose instead we arbitrarily stipulate that the ‘baseline’ for acts that would be 
performed by a code rejecter is the act prescribed by the prevailing morality. Then  
(again for a group of two agents) the comparison between (a) the consequences of a fifty 
per cent acceptance rate for Code C* (one compliant act B with a net social value of 100, 
plus one non-compliant act C with a net social value of ten = 110) and (b) the 
consequences of a fifty per cent acceptance rate for Code C** (one compliant act D with 
a net social value of eighty, plus one non-compliant act C with a net social value of ten = 
ninety) would be as follows: 
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Figure 5  
 
Whichever baseline we use as the act a rejecter would perform, Code C* achieves a 
higher net social utility than Code C**. So it appears that it makes no difference which 
baseline we select as the act the code rejecter would perform, and hence that we need not 
worry about arbitrarily stipulating what act to utilize as the one that a code-rejecter would 
perform.  
 Unfortunately, this appearance is misleading, as are these charts. The argument 
goes wrong in that it does not take into account the value generated by the acceptance of 
some moral code in the society. General acceptance of a moral code would (for example) 
generate psychological costs for violating the code – social disapproval from one’s peers, 
and in some cases feelings of guilt in the code rejecter – which must be included in the 
net social value. If we add these in, it is possible to describe cases in which the highest 
net social utility is produced by C* if the baseline comparison for rejecter acts is the self-
interested act, but is produced instead by C** if the baseline comparison for rejecter acts 
is the act prescribed by the prevailing morality.36 
 To see this, let’s assume that social disapproval experienced by the agent of a 
non-compliant act has a disvalue of minus twenty-five, while the feeling of guilt for not 
accepting and following the code on a given occasion has a disvalue of minus five. Let’s 
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also change the case so that the act prescribed by Code C** is the very same act as that 
prescribed by self-interest, i.e. act A. We then get the following comparison. 
 As before, we begin by stipulating that the ‘baseline’ for acts that would be 
performed by a code rejecter is the self-interested act.  Thus (for a group of two agents) 
the comparison between (a) the consequences of a fifty per cent acceptance rate for Code 
C* (one compliant act B with a net social value of 100, plus one non-compliant act A 
with a net social value of ninety, plus a total of minus thirty from the costs of social 
disapproval and guilt = 160) and (b) the consequences of a fifty per cent acceptance rate 
for Code C** (one compliant act A with a net social value of ninety plus one non-
compliant act A with a net social value of  ninety, plus a total of minus five for feelings 
of guilt = 175) would be as represented in the following chart. Notice that since the act 
prescribed by Code C** is the very same act as the self-interested act, the rejecting agent 
will perform exactly the same act as he would if he accepted and followed Code C**. 
Although he may feel guilt (in acting for the wrong reason), he will not experience social 
disapproval, since no one will know that he was not ‘following’ Code C**. 
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Figure 6 (baseline = self-interested act) 
 
Suppose instead we stipulate that the ‘baseline’ for acts that would be performed by a 
code rejecter is the act prescribed by the prevailing morality. Then (again for a group 
of two agents) the comparison between (a) the consequences of a fifty per cent 
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acceptance rate for Code C* (one act B with a net social value of 100, plus one act C with 
a net social value of ten, plus a total of minus thirty from the costs of social disapproval 
and guilt = eighty) and (b) the consequences of a fifty per cent acceptance rate for Code 
C** (one act A with a net social value of ninety, plus one act C with a net social value of 
ten, plus a total of minus thirty from the costs of social disapproval and guilt = seventy) 
would be as follows: 
 
 
Figure 7 (baseline = act prescribed by prevailing morality) 
 
In these comparisons, Code C** produces higher social value when the baseline is the 
self-interested act, whereas Code C* produces higher social value when the baseline is 
the act prescribed by the prevailing morality. 
 Thus it can make a difference in comparing candidate codes what baseline we 
utilize for the acts that code-rejecting agents would perform. We cannot, then, solve this 
problem, as the rule utilitarian may have hoped, simply by arbitrarily stipulating a 
baseline for non-accepting acts. Since our stipulation makes a difference to which code 
has the best consequences, we need a compelling reason to make one stipulation or 
another – but there isn’t any compelling reason to choose any given baseline. 
 My conclusion is that all forms of rule-utilitarianism are fatally flawed unless 
some solution can be found to the problem of determining, or specifying, what the code-
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rejecters would do instead of accepting the code under consideration. For if we cannot 
determine what the rejecters would do, we cannot say what the expected consequences of 
any given level (short of 100 per cent) of acceptance of a code would be – and hence we 
cannot compare the consequences of rival codes in order to determine which code is 
ideal. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 I have described three different approaches to measuring the consequences of 
rules for purposes of formulating rule-utilitarianism: Hooker’s fixed-rate rule-
utilitarianism (which evaluates rules by their consequences at a fixed rate of acceptance, 
such as ninety per cent), Ridge’s variable-rate rule-utilitarianism (which evaluates rules 
by their consequences at every possible rate of acceptance), and my own suggestion, 
optimum-rate rule-utilitarianism (which evaluates rules by their consequences at their 
optimum acceptance rate). I have then argued that all three of these versions of rule-
utilitarianism fall prey to the same two fatal objections. The first objection is that for all 
three theories, the preferred method for dealing with partial compliance cases invokes the 
use of conditionalized rules (according to which the best act for the agent is conditional 
on what other agents do), but these rules leave the expected social consequences of any 
code incorporating them completely indeterminate. The second fatal objection is that the 
evaluation of a code, as judged according to the expected social consequences of its 
acceptance (either at a single privileged rate lower than 100 per cent, or at all possible 
rates) will turn partly on what actions are performed by those agents who reject it. Since 
there are so many different ways to reject a code, what these code rejecters would do 
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seems simply indeterminate. Moreover, there is no non-discriminatory way of arbitrarily 
stipulating what baseline rejection act the rejecters would perform. Hence again there is 
no way of measuring and comparing what the consequences of rival moral codes would 
be. 
 Unless an improved version of rule-utilitarianism is found that evades these two 
objections, we must be pessimistic about the ultimate fate of this type of theory. 37   
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